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Enriching the NRC's Plausible Strategy Precedent: Another
Uranium Enrichment Facility Permit is Approved
Nuclear Information and Resource Service v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
I. INTRODUCTION
There are currently 104 nuclear reactors in the United States that
provide electricity to American homes and businesses. 2 These reactors,
which are licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"),
provide about 20% of the nation's electricity.3  The fuel used by these
reactors is known as enriched uranium.4 For several decades after the
development of nuclear power, the federal government produced all of the
enriched uranium used to fuel the United States' nuclear reactors.5 In the
early 1990s, Congress decided to privatize uranium enrichment by
forming the United States Enrichment Corporation ("USEC"), which it
later sold.6 The USEC operates the only uranium enrichment plant in the
United States in Paducah, Kentucky. In 1990, Congress amended the
Atomic Energy Act so that the NRC could license the construction and
' 509 F.3d 562 (D.C. Cir. 2007).2 Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Energy,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nucreactors/reactsum.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2007). The State of Missouri's only commercial nuclear reactor is located in
Callaway County. Energy Information Administration, Missouri Nuclear Energy,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/at-a-glance/states/statesmo.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2008). The University of Missouri has two test and research reactors; one at its
Rolla campus, and the other at its Columbia campus. Id.
3 Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nucreactors/reactsum.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2008); Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 565
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
4 See Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 565
(D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Brief for the Federal Respondents at 3-4, Nuclear Info. & Res.
Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
5 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565.
6 id.
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operation of additional privately owned uranium enrichment plants.7 In
the thirteen years following Congress's authorization of the NRC to grant
private licenses to enrich uranium, only two applications were submitted,
both by Louisiana Energy Services ("LES"), the intervenor in this case.
LES's first application, which was later withdrawn, was to build the
"Claiborne" enrichment plant near Homer, Louisiana.9 LES then applied
for a license to build the "National Enrichment Facility" near Eunice, New
Mexico in December of 2003.10 LES's application to build the National
Enrichment Plant in New Mexico and the licensing proceedings are the
subject of this case note.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In order to obtain a license to build and operate a private-sector
uranium enrichment facility, an applicant must present a "plausible
strategy" for disposing of the nuclear waste that the facility will
generate." The strategy must include a reasonable cost estimate for the
disposal strategy, along with assurances that the applicant can pay for
disposal.12  To ensure the applicant has met all the requirements for
licensure, the NRC must conduct an "adjudicatory hearing on the record,"
and must also prepare an environmental impact statement under the
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).8 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv.,509 F.3d at 565. The USEC was issued a license in April
2007 to begin construction on a gas centrifuge plant (the "American Centrifuge Plant").
USEC, http://www.usec.com/v200l_02/HTML/AboutusecCentrifuge.asp (last visited
Feb. 29, 2008).
9 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565; see also 47 N.R.C. 113 (1998).
10 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565.
1 Id.
" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(2) (2000)). Assurances made by the applicant can be in
the form of prepayment (in the form of a trust, escrow account, government fund,
certificate of deposit, or deposit of government securities), surety (in the form of a surety
or performance bond, letter of credit, or line of credit), insurance, or other guarantee
(including parent company guarantee) method, or an external sinking fund in which
deposits are made annually. 42 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(2) (2000).
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National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") before the hearing is
completed.13
LES applied for an Atomic Energy Act ("AEA") license on
December 15, 2003 to construct and operate a uranium enrichmentl 4 plant
near Eunice, New Mexico.' 5 The Nuclear Information and Resource
Service and Public Citizen (hereinafter "NIRS") petitioned to intervene on
April 6, 2004, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Board")
13 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(1), (b)(1)-(2)
(2000)).
14 Natural uranium is roughly 99.3 percent U-238 (heavy-weight), .7 percent U-235
(middle-weight) and less than .01 percent U-234 (lightweight). Nuclear Resource
Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2008). The fuel for nuclear reactors requires a higher concentration of U-
235 (the percentage of U-235 needs to be increased from .7 percent of the uranium mass,
to about 5 percent of the uranium mass) than exists in uranium's natural state. Id. The
process of increasing the amount of U-235 in uranium is called enrichment. Id. There
are currently three methods for enriching uranium: gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and
laser separation. Id. Currently, only gaseous diffusion is being used to commercially
enrich uranium in the United States; however, the plant proposed, and now under
construction by Louisiana Energy Services uses the gas centrifuge method. Id; Brief for
the Federal Respondents at 3-4, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301,
06-1310). The gas centrifuge process, like the gaseous diffusion process, depends on the
slight difference in mass of U-238 and U-235. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 3,
Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10). In order to prepare
for the enrichment process, oxides of natural uranium are chemically converted into
uranium hexafluoride (UF6), which is then shipped to the enrichment plant. Brief for the
Federal Respondents at 4, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-
13 10). -Centrifuge machines are connected in such a way to form trains and cascades.
Nuclear Resource Commission, http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-
enrichment.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). UF6 gas is then placed in a cylinder
rotating at high speed. Id. The rotation speed of the cylinder creates a strong centrifugal
force, which causes the slightly heavier U-238 molecules to concentrate toward the
outside of the cylinder, while the heavier U-235 molecules collect closer to the axis. Id.
The stream which is slightly enriched in U-235 is then fed into the next higher stage,
while the slightly depleted stream is recycled back into the next lower stage.
Significantly more U-235 enrichment is possible using the gas centrifuge process than the
gaseous diffusion process. Id.
5 Reply Brief for Petitioners in Final Form at 3, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
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admitted contentions from NIRS on behalf of three of their members.16
Two New Mexico state agencies also sought intervention in the NRC
proceeding but withdrew their interventions shortly thereafter under a
settlement agreement which required LES to ship its depleted uranium
waste out of state.' 7 The Board then heard NIRS's contentions in a series
of on-the-record hearings.' 8
NIRS alleged to the Board that the NRC's environmental impact
statement ("EIS") was not sufficient in that it had not adequately assessed
the environmental impact of the proposed facility, specifically, the
environmental hazards associated with near-surface and deep disposal of
depleted uranium waste.19 The NRC, responding to an inquiry from the
Board, determined that depleted uranium was "low-level waste,"20 which
in turn made LES's disposal of depleted uranium by the Department of
Energy (DOE) a "plausible strategy" due to the fact that § 3113 of the
USEC Privatization Act requires the DOE to accept waste the NRC
considers "low-level" if asked by an NRC-licensed uranium enrichment
facility to do so. 2 1 The Board then concluded in an evidentiary hearing
that the EIS, as supplemented by the NRC decision and underlying record,
1 Reply Brief for Petitioners in Final Form at 4, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-1310).
17 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 7-8, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562,(Nos. 06-1301, 06-1310). The settlement agreement, aside from requiring that the
depleted uranium be shipped out of state, also set a limit for onsite storage to fifteen
years, set a maximum amount of waste that could be on site at any given time, increased
contingency factor provisions once certain onsite storage levels are reached, and required
triennial reports on LES's decommissioning cost estimates. Id. at 8 n. 2.
1 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 566.
9 Id.
20 See Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting ofHazardous and Radioactive
Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV.
1047, 1080-83 (1994) (discussing the definition and characteristics of low-level waste).21 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 9, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos.
06-1301, 06-1310). 42 U.S.C. § 2297h-11 (2000).
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sufficiently analyzed the impacts of disposal, and that near-surface
disposal was appropriate. 22
NIRS then appealed both the Board's decisions regarding near-
surface and deep disposal to the NRC, arguing that the near-surface
disposal plan did not comply with Part 6123 radioactive material dose
limits and that deep disposal was required in such a case.24 The NRC
noted that "this [was] a proceeding to license a uranium enrichment
facility, not a proceeding to license a near-surface waste disposal facility,"
and thus a lower level of specificity for the waste disposal plan was
acceptable at such an early stage in the proceeding. 25 Addressing the
Board's reliance on NRC staff's reference site, Envirocare,26 the NRC
cited the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, and deferred to the
Board's findings that demonstrated Envirocare would provide a plausible
waste disposal facility. 27 The NRC also held open the possibility of deep
disposal should near-surface disposal prove too hazardous or not in
compliance with Part 61; in short, the NRC did not require Part 61
22 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 11, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10). The NRC acknowledged that the low-level waste classification
was established without NEPA analysis of near-surface disposal of large quantities of
depleted uranium, but allowed the waste impacts contention to proceed "because a formal
waste classification finding is not necessary to resolve the disposal impacts contention."
Reply Brief for Petitioners in Final Form at 7, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
23 See 10 C.F.R. §§ 61.41-42 (2007).
24 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 11, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
25 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 13, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-1310).
26 Envirocare is now called Energy Solutions, LLC. Id. at 11 n. 3.27 Id. at 13-14. The Board accepted focusing on one site for NEPA purposes as an
example because a disposal site could not be fully evaluated until chosen, and noted that
Envirocare was licensed to accept Class A waste for disposal with no current inventory
limits on uranium, and also that Envirocare accepted waste from all regions. Id. at 11-12.
The NRC also noted that the "appropriate regulatory authority" would "conduct any site-
specific evaluations necessary to confirm that radiological dose limits and standards can
be met. . . ." Reply Brief for Petitioners in Final Form at 15, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv.,
509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
597
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. 3
compliance in the EIS.28 The NRC then dismissed NIRS's deep disposal
argument as requiring too much precision at such an early stage in the
application process.2 9  The NRC pointed out that its decision becomes
"part of the environmental 'record of decision' and in effect supplements
the EIS.""o
NIRS next contended to the Board that LES had not presented any
plausible strategies for disposal of the depleted uranium.3 1 LES presented
two possible strategies to the Board for review: (1) the "private-sector
strategy" involved LES transferring its waste to a private facility for
deconversion into a uranium oxide form, at which point the uranium oxide
would be transferred to a licensed disposal facility; and (2) the "public-
sector strategy," which involved transferring its depleted uranium to the
DOE for deconversion and disposal pursuant to the USEC Privatization
Act. 32 The Board concluded that both strategies were "plausible," but that
LES had only met its burden of proof on financial assurance with respect
to the "public-sector strategy." 33
The NRC affirmed the Board's findings that LES had not met its
burden of proof on financial assurance for the private-sector strategy, and
that the public-sector strategy was plausible. 34 The NRC also deemed past
28 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 37-38, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-1310).
29 1d. at 14-15. The NRC also noted when affirming the Board's decision that the
"uranium enrichment process does not create new radioactive waste, but actually depletes
it." Id. Therefore, the NRC reasoned, the "uranium enrichment process (because it
removes U-235) actually reduces some of the hazards associated with uranium in its own
natural state." Id. (quoting CLI 06-15, 63 NRC at 707).
3 0 Id. (quoting CLI 06-15, 63 NRC at 707 n. 91).
31 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 566.3 2 Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2297h-1 l(a)(1) says that the "Secretary [of the DOE] . .. shall accept
for disposal low-level radioactive waste, including depleted uranium if it were ultimately
determined to be low-level radioactive waste, generated by .. . any person licensed by the
NRC to operate a uranium enrichment facility. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2297h-1 l(a)(1) (2000).Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 566. The Board found that the private-sector
strategy proposed by LES lacked reliable cost estimates partly because LES's affiliates
were providing the estimates. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 17, Nuclear Info. &
Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
34 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 566.
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DOE cost overruns as irrelevant, and that the overruns became moot in
any event when LES and NRC Staff agreed to a twenty five percent
contingency allowance, which increased the estimate by twenty five
percent. 35 Therefore, the NRC upheld the cost estimates for the near-
surface public sector waste disposal strategy proposed by LES.
Before the final appeals to the NRC on contested issues, NIRS
filed a motion seeking disqualification of one of the NRC
Commissioners. 36 NIRS argued that the Commissioner's remarks at a
meeting unrelated to the dispute were prejudicial.37 The Commissioner, in
an unrelated proceeding, stated publicly that NIRS used "factoids or
made-up facts or irrelevant facts" to support its positions.38
Commissioner McGaffigan also said that one of NIRS's expert witnesses
was a "person who doesn't know anything about radiation" and in the
same proceeding had called NIRS as the "Nuclear Disinformation
Resource Service." 39 Commissioner McGaffigan acknowledged that his
personal style was to speak his mind, and explained that his statements at
the meeting were "for the purpose of correcting what he perceived to be
inaccuracies or misleading statements on a non-adjudicatory matter"
unrelated to the instant case.40 Commissioner McGaffigan refused to
disqualify himself.41
After completing the contested adjudicatory hearings on NIRS's
contentions and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2243, the Board conducted the
mandatory public hearing on uncontested environmental and safety issues
in March of 2006.42 Three months later, the Board completed its review
and issued a 30-year license for construction and operation of the uranium
3 Reply Brief for Petitioners in Final Form at 19-20, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d
562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-1310).
36 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 22, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
37 Id.
38 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 571.
39 id.
40 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 23, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-1310).
4 1 Id. at 29.
42 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 566.
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enrichment facility in New Mexico.43  The NRC did not disturb the
Board's authorization of the license, and the decision became final two
months later.44 Construction of the National Enrichment Facility has now
begun and is expected to be completed in 2009.45 The NRC held that LES
had presented a plausible strategy for waste disposal and that the Board
complied with the AEA in using materials contained in the adjudicatory
record, but not contained in the EIS in making its determinations.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Up until the early 1990s, the Federal Government produced all of
the enriched uranium used to fuel America's nuclear reactors.46 In the
1990s, Congress privatized uranium enrichment operations by forming the
United States Enrichment Corporation ("USEC").47 In 1990, Congress
also amended the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA") to allow the NRC to
license the construction and operation of additional privately owned and
operated uranium enrichment plants.48 LES filed two applications to build
a uranium enrichment facility following the enactment of the legislation.49
Currently, only two licenses to build privately owned uranium enrichment
plants have been granted. Since only three applications have been
submitted, and only two licenses have been issued for construction of
uranium enrichment facilities, decisions interpreting the statutes and
regulations governing the licensure of such facilities are sparse.
43 id
4 Id.
45 Id.; Urenco, The National Enrichment Facility,
http://www.urenco.com/sectionFrontPage.aspx?m= 1705.
46 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565.
47 I(.;,see also USEC Privatization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 3101-17, 110 Stat. 1321,
1321-335 to-350 (1996).
48 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565; see also Solar, Wind, Waste, and
Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575, § 5, 104
Stat. 2834, 2835-36 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000)).
49 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 565.
50
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a. The Environmental Impact Statement
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has two main
goals: (1) to place "upon an agency the obligation to consider every
significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action,"'51
and (2) to ensure that the agency will "inform the public that the agency
has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process." 52
The AEA requires that an environmental impact statement be "prepared. .
. before the hearing on the issuance of a license for the construction and
operation of a uranium enrichment facility is completed." 53 The AEA also
says that the "issuance of a license . . . for the construction and operation
of a uranium enrichment plant is a major federal action . ..54 Under the
NEPA, a federal agency proposing a major "[f]ederal action affecting the
quality of the human environment" is required to provide a "detailed
statement" discussing "(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented," and "(iii) alternatives to the
proposed action."55
The first argument advanced by NIRS was that the NRC violated
the AEA by "supplementing" the EIS after the adjudicatory hearing on the
license application. 56 As noted above, when the application is filed an EIS
is required by statute to be prepared.57 The NRC then prepares both draft
and final EISs.58 NRC regulations permit anyone with an "interest" that
may be affected by the proceeding to intervene in the proceeding as long
as the person specifies the contentions which he or she seeks to have
s' Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553
(1978).52 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ.Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(2) (2000); see also 10 C.F.R. § 51.97(c) (2000).
54 42 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(1) (2000).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(iii)(2000).
56 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 568 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
57 See supra p. 8; Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978).
58 42 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (2007); see also Brief for the Federal Respondents at 4, Nuclear
Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562 (Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
601
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 15, No. 3
litigated.59 Intervenors may file contentions and seek adjudicatory
hearings on environmental issues.60 Pursuant to § 2243(b), adjudicatory
hearings on uranium enrichment facilities are formal, "on-the-record"
proceedings. 61 The adjudicatory record and Board decisions, along with
any appellate decisions by the Commission in effect become part of the
final EIS.62 If the litigant is unsatisfied with the Board's rulings, the
litigant will have fifteen days to appeal the Board's decision to the NRC.63
NIRS's next argument was that the NRC's review of the EIS was
deficient, and did not adequately analyze the impact of uranium waste
disposal from the enrichment facility. 64  Judicial review of an EIS
guarantees that the agency "adequately considered and disclosed the
environmental impact of its actions."65 The reviewing court considers
whether the agency in question "took a 'hard look' at the environmental
consequences of its decision to go forward with the project." 66  The role
of the court is only to consider whether the agency decision is "arbitrary
59 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a) (2007); see also Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n 194 F.3d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing the definition of "interest" and
standing for parties seeking to intervene in NRC proceedings).
10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a) (2007).
6i 42 U.S.C. § 2243(b) (2000).
62 In re La. Energy Servs., L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), 47 N.R.C. 77, 89 (1998)(citing In re Phila. Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), 22 N.R.C. 681,705-07 (1985)); see also Citizens for Safe Power v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 524
F.2d 1291, 1294 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rejecting argument that more public comment
would have been submitted had supplemental material been added as speculative); see
also New England Coal. on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d
87, 94 (1st Cir. 1978) (omissions from an EIS may be amended or supplemented simply
by subsequent consideration in agency hearings); see also 10 C.F.R. § 51.92 (2007)(describing the procedure for supplementing the EIS, which NIRS did not challenge).63 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(1) (2007).
64 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 569 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
65 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983).
6 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,410 n. 21 (1976); Cmtys. Against Runway
Expansion v. F.A.A., 355 F.3d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Matthew C.
Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 753 (providing a critique of "hard look" review).
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and capricious." 67 An agency decision will not be arbitrary and capricious
so long as the agency has scrutinized the EIS and provided a satisfactory
explanation for its decision, including a "rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made." 68  Where an agency is "making
predictions within its area of special expertise" as "opposed to simple
findings of fact," a "reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential." 69 The NEPA does not mandate particular results in and of
itself, but merely details the process used by the NRC for review of an
EIS.70
b. A "Plausible" Strategy
NIRS also argued that the NRC should not have approved the
license because LES did not present a reasonable cost estimate for
disposing of the radioactive waste generated by the facility.71  An
applicant applying for a license to construct and operate a uranium
enrichment facility is not required to present a "concrete plan" for disposal
of the radioactive waste generated by the facility. 72 Instead, the applicant
is only required to present a "plausible strategy for the disposition of
depleted uranium waste." 73 Although an applicant may present more than
one strategy for review (as in this case), NRC regulations require only one
disposal strategy to be "plausible." 74  Section 3113 of the USEC
Privatization Act requires the DOE to take title to the waste generated by
an enrichment facility (assuming it has been determined by the
commission to constitute low-level radioactive waste, which in the present
" Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 97-98.
68 Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).69 Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 103.70 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
71 In re La. Energy Servs., L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), 34 N.R.C. 332, 337
(1991); Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 569
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
72 In re La. Energy Servs., L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), 34 N.R.C. at 337.
7 Id.
74 See 10 C.F.R. § 70.25(a) (2007).
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case it was) at the generator's request, with the generator reimbursing the
DOE for the disposal costs.75
Along with presenting a "plausible strategy" for waste disposal, an
applicant must also present a reasonable cost estimate for disposal, and
give adequate assurance that the applicant can pay the costs both of
disposal, and of decommissioning the plant at the end of its useful life.76
When examining the reasonableness of cost estimates, the NRC will not
accept arguments based on past cost overruns and the "character" of either
the licensee or the party charged with disposal unless there is a "direct and
obvious relationship between the character issues and the licensing action
in dispute."77 Therefore, unless the previous cost overruns will have any
direct bearing on the particular licensing proceeding, they will not be
taken into account by the NRC when considering the reasonableness of the
applicant's cost estimate for disposal. The reviewing court will again
examine the NRC's determinations in a deferential manner.79
c. Commissioner Disqualification
NIRS also moved to disqualify an NRC Commissioner, arguing
that the commissioner had made comments in the past that made him
biased against NIRS.8 0  A commissioner's decision not to recuse or
disqualify himself is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.8 '
There is a presumption that administrative officers are objective and
" 42 U.S.C. § 2297h-l l(a)(1)(B), (2) (2000).76 See 42 U.S.C. § 2243(d)(2) (2000); see also 10 C.F.R. § 70.25(a), (e) (2007).
n In re Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3),
54 N.R.C. 354, 365 (2001).78 Id. at 365-66; see also In re La.Energy Servs., L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), 64
N.R.C. 37,46 n. 38 ("Allegations of management improprieties or poor 'integrity' ... must
be of more than historical interest: they must relate directly to the proposed licensing
action.").
7 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 571 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).80 id.
81 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't. of Transp., 899 F.2d 1230, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Metro. Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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"capable of judling a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances." The presumption cannot be rebutted just because the
agency official has "taken a public position, or has expressed strong
views, or holds an underlying philosophy with respect to an issue in
dispute . . . ."83 Agency officials are not obliged to be subjectively
impartial; rather, the agencies are only required to objectively evaluate
arguments and consider them in good faith.84 An agency official should
only be disqualified where a "disinterested observer may conclude that the
decisionmaker has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law
of a particular case in advance of hearing it."85 This language has been
construed to mean that a commissioner may only be disqualified where he
has "demonstrably made up [his] mind about important and specific
factual questions and [is] impervious to contrary evidence." 86
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The United States Court .of Appeals for the District of Columbia
addressed the question of whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
complied with the National Environmental Policy Act and the Atomic
Energy Act. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the court, held
that NRC had complied with all of the provisions of both the NEPA and
the AEA, and upheld the NRC's decision to grant the license for a new,
privately owned uranium enrichment facility in New Mexico.88  NIRS
82 United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (quoting U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,421 (1941)).83 Id. (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S.
482, 493 (1976)).
8 Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. U.S., 510 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also
Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("agency
decisionmakers are appointed precisely to implement statutory programs, and so
inevitably have some policy preconceptions").
85 Metro. Council ofNAACP, 46 F.3d at 1164-65 (citing Cinderella Career & Finishing
Sch., Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).86 Id. at 1165 (quoting United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1209).
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advanced four arguments against granting the license: (1) that the NRC
supplemented the environmental impact statement during the hearing
process, and thus violated the Atomic Energy Act; (2) that the NRC failed
to adequately address the environmental consequences of disposing of the
facility's uranium waste and therefore violated the National
Environmental Policy Act; (3) that LES's cost estimate for the waste
disposal was unreasonable; and (4) that NRC Commissioner McGaffigan
should have disqualified himself from the licensure proceeding because
Commissioner McGaffigan made comments regarding NIRS in an
unrelated proceeding, and thus the review of the license application was
not impartial.
Before addressing NIRS's claims, the court first turned to the issue
of whether NIRS had standing to bring the suit in the first place.90 The
court noted that organizations will have standing under Article III of the
Constitution by showing "that at least one of its members would have
standing to sue in his or her own right." 91. The court noted that this was a
procedural rights case where the party had a "procedural right to protect
his concrete interests." 92 In these cases, the party will have standing to
challenge an agency's failure to follow a procedural requirement "so long
as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened
concrete interest" of the party. 93 The court also noted that individuals
living near a proposed federal project and alleging a concrete injury have
standing in NEPA and other procedural rights cases. 94 NIRS claimed that
because the NRC had not identified a suitable waste disposal strategy for
the facility, the waste would be stored at the facility and emit harmful
radiation, which would harm citizens (who were also members of NIRS)
living near the facility. 9 5 The court then concluded that because NIRS's
claims, if successful, would require the NRC to take additional steps and
9 Id. at 566.
90Id. at 567.
91 Id. (citing Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).92Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n. 7 (1992)).93Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8).
94 id
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at least delay construction of the facility, that NIRS's claims were
sufficient to give them standing. 96
The court then moved on to NIRS's first argument, that the NRC
violated the Atomic Energy Act by supplementing the Environmental
Impact Statement after the close of hearings on the license application. 97
The court began by reviewing the provisions that applied, most notably
Section 193 of the Atomic Energy Act, which states, "An environmental
impact statement . . . shall be prepared before the hearing on the issuance
of a license for the construction and operation of a uranium enrichment
facility is completed." 98 The court then pointed out that the draft EIS was
completed in September 2004, and the final EIS was completed in July
2005, both well before the NRC's decisions regarding NIRS's
contentions.99 The court concluded that the NRC satisfied the requirement
that the EIS be completed before the hearing. 00
NIRS argued' 0' that because written opinions of the NRC and
Licensing Board and information not contained in the EIS were used when
ruling on one of NIRS's contentions, that the EIS was not "prepared"
before the hearing.102 The court, however, ruled that the NRC had
complied with the Atomic Energy Act because all that was required was
an EIS before the hearing, which the NRC had completed. 03
NIRS next argued that the NRC's NEPA review was deficient
because the impact of uranium waste disposal from the enrichment facility
was not sufficiently analyzed.104 Specifically, NIRS alleged that the EIS
did not adequately discuss the use of near-surface disposal for the waste
generated by the enrichment facility and its use of Envirocare as a sort of




9 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2243(a)(2) (2000)).
99 Id
' Id.
101 NIRS did not argue that the NRC's method of supplementing the EIS violated the
NEPA. Id.
102 id
'0 Id. at 569.
105 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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prescribed the process, not the result, and was to consider whether the
"agency took a hard look at the environmental consequences of its actions
to go forward with the project." 06 The court found that the NRC had
carefully examined the consequences of waste disposal in the EIS.10 7 In
reaching its conclusion, the court pointed out that multiple sections of the
EIS discussed both the waste the facility would generate, and how the
waste was to be disposed of. 0 8 The EIS considered the possibility of both
private and public sector disposal facilities licensed to accept various types
of low-level waste, described different scenarios for converting and
transporting the waste, and analyzed the environmental effects of all the
options. 109 The NRC also developed an extensive record of its own aside
from the EIS"l0 and examined the long-term effects of disposing of the
depleted uranium."' The court concluded that the NRC easily met its
responsibility of examining the environmental consequences of granting
the license. 2
NIRS's next contention was that the NRC should not have
approved the license because the cost estimate for waste disposal was
unreasonable.11 3 NIRS contended that LES's cost estimates were too low
and should be higher based on the Department of Energy's past history of
cost overruns. 114 The court began by saying an applicant only needs to
present a "plausible strategy"l5 for the disposition of depleted uranium
waste,"ll 6 not a concrete plan." 7 The NRC granted the license to LES
16o Id at 568-69.
'
0 Id. at 569.
109Id
"
0 NIRS attacked NRC's record as "supplementing" the EIS, even though NRC's record
was largely developed in response to NIRS's environmental contentions. Id.
11 Id.
114 Id. at 570.
115 NIRS accepted the "plausible strategy" requirement as the standard, and was arguing
that NRC did not have a plausible strategy, much less a concrete plan. Id. at 569.
m 6Id. (quoting In re La. Energy Servs., L.P., 34 N.R.C. 332, 337 (1991)).7 Id.
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based on its "public sector strategy," in which the Department of Energy
takes title to and disposes of the facility's waste, at LES's cost." 8 NIRS
did not dispute the plausibility of the public sector strategy, and instead
argued that the cost estimate for this strategy understated the probable
costs.1 9 The court dismissed a large portion of NIRS's contentions
because they related to the "private sector strategy," while the NRC
granted LES's license based solely on the public sector strategy.120 LES's
cost estimate be an with the Department of Energy's cost estimate for
waste disposal.' 2  LES then added 25% to the Department of Energy's
cost estimate, as a "contingency factor" to protect against unforeseen
costs. 122 NIRS asserted that the "contingency factor" should have been
much higher because of the Department of Energy's supposed history of
underestimating costs on other projects.123 The court rejected this line of
argument because, like the NRC, it found that the cost overruns only dealt
with the Department of Energy's overruns on unrelated past projects. 124
The court noted that unless NIRS demonstrated "a direct and obvious
relationship between the character issues and the licensing action in
dispute," the argument could not succeed. 125 Since NIRS presented no
evidence that the Department of Energy's estimate for the particular
project was understated, the court did not find that the waste disposal
estimate was unreasonable based on the 25% contingency factor.1 26
The next argument presented by NIRS regarding the
reasonableness of the cost estimate for waste disposal involved the type of
waste disposal that was being proposed, known as "near-surface
..8 Id. at 569-70.
"' Id. at 569-70.
120 Id. at n. 4.
121 Id. at 570.
122 id.
123 Id., see also Government Accountability Office, Department of Energy: Major
Construction Projects Need a Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness
to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d07336high.pdf (Department of Energy has exceeded
costs significantly on "many" occasions).
124 id.
12 5 Id. (quoting In re La. Energy Servs., L.P., 64 N.R.C. 37, 46 n. 38 (2006)).
12 6 id.
609
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 15, No. 3
disposal." 27  NIRS argued that "near-surface disposal" would be
inappropriate due to the nature of the waste being produced, and that the
project would require "deep disposal," 28 which is significantly more
expensive than "near-surface disposal." 29 The court noted that the NRC
required only a showing by LES that it could pay for near-surface
disposal, and that near-surface disposal of the type of waste in question is
permitted under current federal regulations.130  The court dismissed
NIRS's argument by saying its role was not to "micromanage the NRC's
licensure proceeding, or to second-guess its acceptance of reasonable cost
estimates," and that its only role was to examine whether the NRC
reasonably concluded that LES presented a plausible strategy with
reasonable cost estimates.' 3 1 Furthermore, in light of its deferential
review, the court concluded it had no basis to rule against the NRC's
determination that LES's cost estimate based on near-surface disposal was
reasonable.132
NIRS's final argument was that NRC Commissioner
McGaffiganl 33 should have disqualified himself from considering the
license application because he had stated in an unrelated previous
proceeding that NIRS had used "factoids or made-up facts or irrelevant
facts" to support its positions. 34 NIRS argued that the NRC's decision
127 d
128 Near-surface disposal, as the name suggests, involves disposing of the depleted
uranium relatively near the surface of the earth, whereas deep disposal deposits the waste
hundreds or thousands of feet underground in a geological repository. Id
131 Id.
132Id. at 571.
1 Commissioner McGaffigan passed away on September 2, 2007. NRC News, Edward
McGaffigan, Longest Serving NRC Comissioner Dies, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/news/2007/07-112.html.134 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 571 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). Commissioner McGaffigan also said that one of NIRS's expert witnesses was
a "person who doesn't know anything about radiation" and in the same proceeding had
called NIRS as the "Nuclear Disinformation Resource Service." Id.
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should be vacated and reviewed by an impartial panel.135  The court
pointed out that administrative officers are presumed to be able to judge
any particular controversy objectively, and that a party may not overcome
the presumption by merely showing that the administrative officer "has
taken a public position, or has expressed strong views, or holds an
underlying philosophy with respect to an issue in dispute."' 36 The agency
official may only be disqualified where a disinterested observer could
conclude that the official had adjudged the case before hearing it.'17 The
court then concluded that since it was Commissioner McGaffigan's
"personal style" to speak "vigorously and sometimes colorfully" to spark
debate, and because the comments were made in an unrelated, separate
proceeding, that Commissioner McGaffigan had not adjudged the facts in
advance of hearing the case, and therefore did not abuse his discretion in
granting the license.138
Accordingly, the court denied NIRS's petitions for review and
upheld the NRC's decision to grant the license to LES.139
V. COMMENT
NIRS is the first case dealing with the licensure of a uranium
enrichment facility, and thus its decision should act as a guideline to future
license applicants. In 2007, the NRC received 7 applications to build new
nuclear power plants, and between 2007 and 2009, it expects to receive
applications for licenses to build 32 new power reactor units. 140
Additionally, it is expected that almost all of the existing nuclear power
plants will seek 20-year extension of their operating licenses, with many
plants looking to increase their NRC-authorized generating capacity. 14 1
135 id




140 Roland M. Frye, Jr., Restricted Communication at the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 319-21 (2007) (summarizing NRC
Commissioner's remarks regarding new applications for licenses).
141 id
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With this "nuclear renaissance" happening in the U.S., the .need for
enriched uranium, especially from domestic sources, will continue to
increase.142 With only one existing uranium enrichment plant (which is
expected to be decommissioned once USEC completes its other
enrichment plant in Ohio) and two enrichment plants under construction,
license applications for uranium enrichment facilities are expected to
increase. 14 The NIRS decision sheds light not only on the timing and
scope of the EIS required in the application process, but on the specificity
and "plausibility" of the waste disposal strategy as well as the cost
estimates required for that strategy.
In addressing NIRS's argument that the NRC did not in fact submit
an EIS before the "single adjudicatory hearing," the court took a very
literal approach and said regardless of whether the NRC "supplemented"
the EIS, all it was required to do under § 2243 was prepare an EIS prior to
the completion of the adjudicatory hearing.'" While this dealt with the
specific challenge raised by NIRS in this case (that no EIS was prepared
before the hearing due to the supplementation), it is unclear how the court
would have come out had NIRS challenged the procedure used to
"supplement" the EIS. Although NRC administrative decisions have
upheld the practice of supplementing the Final EIS with records of
administrative decisions, there is no case law regarding the specific
142 John Miller, Companies Race to Open New Uranium Enrichment Facilities in U.S.,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/27/business/uranium.php?page=1. The 104 nuclear
power plants in the U.S. currently get about 85 percent of their enriched uranium from
foreign sources, including roughly 40 percent from Russia under a program where
uranium in old Russian nuclear warheads is converted to fuel for nuclear reactors. Id
The Russian warhead program is scheduled to end in 2013, and a replacement agreement
would only bring in about half the enriched uranium under the current deal. Id.
Furthermore, the U.S.'s only currently operational enrichment plant in Paducah,
Kentucky is scheduled to be closed once USEC completes its new uranium enrichment
plant in Ohio. Id
143 id
' Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 509 F.3d 562, 568 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
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question of whether it applies to § 193 of the AEA.1 45 I any event,
supplementing the EIS with information gathered in the adjudicatory
decisions is a well-established practice, and a ruling that an EIS was in
fact "supplemented" by an adjudicatory hearing (resulting in no EIS being
prepared) would result in a circular cycle of NRC preparing a
supplemental EIS every time new information was presented.146
A more important part of the court's decision was its ruling
regarding the "plausible strategy" requirement. The NIRS court elaborated
on the requirement that a "plausible strategy" for waste disposal be
submitted by the license applicant. The court in NIRS essentially adopted
NRC's administrative decision precedent in determining that a "concrete
plan" did not need to be presented by the applicant.147 Since the Court's
level of deference was substantial, the determinations made by the NRC
that the waste generated by the facility was low-level, and that near-
surface disposal was acceptable became very important. These
determinations regarding the actual waste disposal strategy in effect
precluded the court from examining any of the actual methods for waste
disposal, since the level of deference, especially with regard to technical
matters, was very high with regard to agency determinations. Due to the
level of deference used by the court, it could be argued that any time the
"public-sector" strategy is submitted by an applicant and approved by
NRC the court really will not have any room to question the actual
methods and strategy used for disposal. It appears that the public-sector
strategy will almost always be "plausible" with regard to disposal, and
instead the reviewing court will only look to see whether the NRC
reasonably concluded that a reasonable cost estimate had been submitted
with regard to the disposal strategy. 148
Only requiring a plausible strategy, as opposed to a concrete plan,
does make sense for both agencies and applicants, as requiring approval of
every aspect of a plan would make it nearly impossible for a license to be
granted, while also increasing the financial risk of beginning such a
14542 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000).
14 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 49, Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d 562
(Nos. 06-1301, 06-13 10).
147 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 569.
148 See Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv., 509 F.3d at 570.
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project, since every aspect of the strategy could be questioned. It also
allows flexibility for both the agency and applicant should circumstances
change. While the flexibility of the plausible strategy helps the NRC and
applicants, it also helps the environment, since it allows waste to be
reclassified by the NRC and disposal plans to change should
environmental concerns arise in later stages of construction or operation of
the facility.
VI. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit followed past NRC precedent and adopted NRC
precedent in affirming the decision of the NRC to grant a 30-year license
to LES to build and operate a uranium enrichment facility. Adopting
records of decisions into EISs streamlines the application process, while
simultaneously addressing the environmental concerns of the public.
Requiring only a plausible strategy during the application process allows
needed flexibility for applicants and the NRC in making decisions, while
providing the needed consideration of waste disposal impacts and costs.
The deferential review of agency decisions used by the courts when
examining both the EIS process and waste disposal strategy follows well-
established precedent and allows NRC to exercise its technical expertise.
As the "nuclear renaissance" continues, the guidelines and requirements
laid out in NIRS will be an important roadmap for both uranium
enrichment plant license applicants and NRC, as well as environmental
groups.
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